Module 13: Active Directory Enumeration
Abusing Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
Understanding LDAP
LDAP was designed to interact with a directory service, such as Active Directory. It is built upon the client-server model.
LDAP clients send requests called operations to an LDAP server. These are used to authenticated clients or retrieve/modify entries within a directory.

Interacting with LDAP
LDAP is inter-operable with custom applications, which is largely possible due to the inclusion of Active Directory Service Interfaces (ADSI).
PowerShell script to perform LDAP lookup
PS C:\Users\offsec> $Searcher = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher
PS C:\Users\offsec> $Searcher.Filter = '(distinguishedName=CN=DC-2,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=com)'
PS C:\Users\offsec> $Searcher.FindOne()
PowerShell script to execute LDAP as a different user
PS C:\Users\offsec> $Searcher = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher
PS C:\Users\offsec> $Searcher.SearchRoot = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://DC=corp,DC=com", 'corp\jdoe','Qwerty09!')
PS C:\Users\offsec> $Searcher.Filter = '(&(objectClass=computer)(cn=*dc*))'
PS C:\Users\offsec> $Searcher.FindAll()
Path Properties
---- ----------
LDAP://CN=DC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=com {ridsetreferences, logoncount, codepage, ob...
LDAP://CN=DC-2,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=com {logoncount, codepage, objectcategory, iscr...
Enumerating Active Directory with PowerView
PowerView contains dozens of functions that can be used to enumerate Active Directory. They incorporate OS APIs.
Detecting Active Directory Enumeration
Auditing Object Access
To identify malicious enumeration events taking place against AD, we need to implement an audit policy. These are extensions of the built-in Windows logging.
We can display and configure audit policies with the auditpol command line utility.
Listing audit policy categories
PS C:\Windows\system32> auditpol /list /category
Category/Subcategory
Account Logon
Account Management
Detailed Tracking
DS Access
Logon/Logoff
Object Access
Policy Change
Privilege Use
System
Listing audit policy subcategories
and PS C:\Windows\system32> auditpol /list /subcategory:*
Category/Subcategory
...
DS Access
Directory Service Access
Directory Service Changes
Directory Service Replication
Detailed Directory Service Replication
...
Listing audit policy subcategory setting
PS C:\Windows\system32> auditpol /get /subcategory:"Directory Service Access"
System audit policy
Category/Subcategory Setting
DS Access
Directory Service Access Success



Object audit security elements
Principal
The identity that is being targeted for auditing
Type
Target success, failure, or both types of events
Access
Types of permissions that can be granted (and tracked)
Inherited From
Designates whether an audit entry was configured at a higher level than the target object, which would recurse down to any sub entries.
Applies To
Designates whether the entry is targeting only the current object, descendant objects, or specific object types

Key information
Subject: Details about the Account that accessed the object.
Object: Details about the object accessed.
Operation: Details about the action taken place.
Baseline Monitoring
Utilize XPath filters to select specific nodes from an XML document. When using the "Filter Current Log" option in Event Viewer, we are essentially building an XPath query that is parsed by the logging engine to provide the requested data.


XPath query for expected access
$FilterXML = @'
<QueryList>
<Query Id="0" Path="Security">
<Select Path="Security">
*[System[(EventID=4662)]] and *[EventData[(Data[@Name='SubjectUserSid']='S-1-5-21-2154860315-1826001137-329834519-1107')]] and *[EventData[(Data[@Name='ObjectName']='%{0ca1d341-b9ee-4d46-ab3b-3a2732aa4b51}')]] and *[EventData[(Data[@Name='OperationType']='Object Access')]]
</Select>
</Query>
</QueryList>
'@
Running Get-WinEvent with created XPath
PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-WinEvent -FilterXml $FilterXML
ProviderName: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
TimeCreated Id LevelDisplayName Message
----------- -- ---------------- -------
1/19/2022 11:24:04 AM 4662 Information An operation was performed on an object....
1/19/2022 11:24:04 AM 4662 Information An operation was performed on an object....
1/19/2022 11:24:04 AM 4662 Information An operation was performed on an object....
...
Get-WinEvent script with XML parsing
$Logs = Get-WinEvent -LogName Security -FilterXPath $FilterXML
ForEach ($L in $Logs) {
[xml]$XML = $L.toXml()
$TimeStamp = $XML.Event.System.TimeCreated.SystemTime
$SubjectUserName = $XML.Event.EventData.Data[1].'#text'
$ObjectName = $XML.Event.EventData.Data[6].'#text'
$AccessMask = $XML.Event.EventData.Data[10].'#text'
[PSCustomObject]@{'TimeStamp' = $TimeStamp; 'SubjectUserName' = $SubjectUserName; 'ObjectName' = $ObjectName; 'AccessMask' = $AccessMask }
}
Results from updated Get-WinEvent script
PS C:\Windows\system32> C:\Users\offsec\Desktop\Audit.ps1
TimeStamp SubjectUserName ObjectName AccessMask
--------- --------------- ---------- ----------
2022-01-19T16:24:04.312607600Z offsec %{0ca1d341-b9ee-4d46-ab3b-3a2732aa4b51} 0x10
2022-01-19T16:24:04.312154600Z offsec %{0ca1d341-b9ee-4d46-ab3b-3a2732aa4b51} 0x10
2022-01-19T16:24:04.048692000Z offsec %{0ca1d341-b9ee-4d46-ab3b-3a2732aa4b51} 0x10
2022-01-19T16:24:04.048326000Z offsec %{0ca1d341-b9ee-4d46-ab3b-3a2732aa4b51} 0x10
...
XPath filter to suppress displaying events where the SID matches offsec's SID
<QueryList>
<Query Id="0" Path="Security">
<Select Path="Security">
*[System[(EventID=4662)]] and
*[EventData[(Data[@Name='ObjectName']='%{0ca1d341-b9ee-4d46-ab3b-3a2732aa4b51}')]] and
*[EventData[(Data[@Name='OperationType']='Object Access')]]
</Select>
<Suppress Path="Security">
*[EventData[(Data[@Name='SubjectUserSid']='S-1-5-21-2154860315-1826001137-329834519-1107')]]
</Suppress>
</Query>
</QueryList>
Using Honey Tokens
The difference between a honey token and a general honeypot is that a honey token is a collection of different types of objects created throughout the directory. Any traffic destined to these lures should be considered suspect.
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